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Abstract
Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to
avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It
assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and
that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that
whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the mea-
surement exist. This assertion of multiplicity has been understood
in many ways by proponents of Everett’s theory. Here we shall illus-
trate how different views on multiplicity carry onto different views on
spacetime.
1 Introduction
Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics [1, 2] was proposed in a con-
text where challenges to quantum interpretational orthodoxy were not well
received [3]. At the time, the prevailing view drew both from the Copenhagen
distinction between the quantum and the classical and from the Dirac–von
Neumann collapse of the state vector.
Everett’s framework attempts to do away with the collapse of the state
vector, and to correct for a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the Copen-
hagen interpretation. The latter requires, in particular, a classical world
logically prior to the quantum world, as well as observers outside quantum
systems under investigation. In contradistinction to this, Everett’s frame-
work incorporates the following characteristics:
1. The state vector always evolves unitarily.
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2. The ‘observer’ is included in the quantum description.
3. When a quantum measurement is performed, all results of the mea-
surement occur.
4. ‘Collapse’ happens relative to the observer only.
5. Quantum mechanics applies to the whole universe.
This general framework was, to some extent, articulated in Everett’s pub-
lished work which, however, left a number of questions only partly answered.
Over the years, three problems have developed and received considerable at-
tention from proponents of (or opponents to) Everett’s approach. They have
to do with probability, the preferred basis and multiplicity.
2 Three problems in Everett’s approach
2.1 Probability
The probability problem in Everett’s approach is twofold. The first horn of
the problem concerns determinism, the second one has to do with numerical
values.
As indicated above, according to Everett the state vector always evolves
unitarily, in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation. So the question is,
How can probability arise if evolution is completely deterministic? The an-
swer given by Everettians is that probability is not objective. Rather, it
represents an observer’s subjective uncertainty as to his post-measurement
situation.
In quantum mechanics, numerical values of probability are given by the
Born rule. Everett claimed that the Born rule does not need to be separately
postulated, but can be derived naturally from the quantum formalism. The
derivation turned out to be not so straightforward. Later investigators at-
tempted to show that a rational agent who believes he or she lives in an
Everettian universe will make decisions as if the square amplitude measure
gave chances for outcomes. This has given rise to much debate [4], and the
issue is not settled.
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2.2 The preferred basis
Consider a two-state quantum system and an observable A with orthonormal
eigenvectors |a1〉 and |a2〉. A measurement of A will involve an apparatus in
an initial state |α0〉 which, upon interaction with the quantum system, will
evolve to |α1〉 or |α2〉, respectively, if the system is prepared in |a1〉 or |a2〉.
If the quantum system’s initial state is a superposition of |a1〉 and |a2〉,
the system and apparatus will evolve as
(c1|a1〉+ c2|a2〉)|α0〉 → c1|a1〉|α1〉+ c2|a2〉|α2〉. (1)
But the final state can also be written as
c′
1
|a′
1
〉|α′
1
〉+ c′
2
|a′
2
〉|α′
2
〉, (2)
with |α′
1
〉 and |α′
2
〉 orthogonal linear combinations of |α1〉 and |α2〉 (and |a
′
1
〉
and |a′
2
〉 linear combinations of |a1〉 and |a2〉).
Now the question is, Why do we always observe well-defined macroscopic
states |α1〉 and |α2〉, instead of ill-defined macroscopic states |α
′
1
〉 and |α′
2
〉?
The most popular answer is that the property of decoherence [5], which is
independent of any interpretational frame, favors well-defined macroscopic
states.
2.3 Multiplicity
In Everett’s framework, all results of a measurement occur. Here the question
is, What does this statement mean from an ontological point of view? Everett
was not entirely clear on how to answer this question, at least in his published
work. His followers have developed three distinct types of answer:
1. Many worlds: The whole universe splits in different copies.
2. Many minds: Although apparatus and brain states superpose, con-
sciousness is well-defined.
3. Reality is identified with patterns in the universal wave function.
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3 Interpreting quantum mechanics
Everett’s approach provides an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of
course, there are many others [6]. But what does it mean to interpret quan-
tum mechanics? According to the semantic view of theories [7, 8] it consists
in answering the question, How can the world be for quantum mechanics to
be true?
From this point of view, the problem of multiplicity is more pressing than
the other two [9]. Indeed simply postulating the Born rule, as is usually done,
will make probability well defined. And the preferred basis problem can also
be solved by a specification, adequately guided by results from decoherence
theory.
The extent of the ontological problem of multiplicity, gathered from the
substantial literature on Everett’s approach, has been analysed in [10]. The
purpose of this paper is to see how the problem of multiplicity carries onto
the ontological problem of spacetime.
4 Many worlds
As we pointed out above, Everett’s views on multiplicity are not fully clarified
in his published work. Probably the most straightforward way to understand
multiplicity is to associate it with a literal split. That idea was popularized
by DeWitt [11]:
This universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous number
of branches, all resulting from the measurementlike interactions
between its myriads of components. Moreover, every quantum
transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every
remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth
into myriads of copies of itself.
This quote suggests that a split occurs everytime an interaction produces
entanglement, whether or not macroscopic objects are involved. Everett,
however, introduced multiplicity only in contexts where something like a
macroscopic apparatus performs a measurement. Considerations will hence-
forth be restricted to such situations.
Healey [12] was the first to formalize the consequences of splitting on the
nature of space. He first considered the possibility that systems split into n
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copies, in usual ordinary space. But then, so he argues, mass-energy would
be multiplied by n and we would presumably be aware of the overcrowding
of space. Accordingly, the split can become acceptable in two different ways:
1. The physical systems do not split, only their states do.
2. Not only systems, but space itself splits. The resulting systems may be
viewed as living in a higher-dimensional manifold.
The first way anticipates multiplicity viewed as decoherent sectors of the
wave function, which we will examine later. The second way is perhaps the
easiest one to visualize. It involves multiple copies of spacetime, all of them
multiplying further upon each measurement interaction. It does, however,
raise a number of questions usually associated with state vector collapse:
When, in the measurement process, does the split occur? Does the split
occur on an equal-time hypersurface, or on a light cone (so as to be more
consonant with special relativity)? What are the precise conditions that
define a measurement?
Related to splitting is the intriguing question of recombination. If evolu-
tion is unitary, measurements can in principle be undone. Just like worlds,
multiple copies of spacetime should then recombine. This, however, can be
avoided by means of bifurcation, an alternative to splitting introduced by
Deutsch [13]. The idea is that there are infinitely many worlds (or spaces)
at any time. Their number neither increases nor decreases. In measure-
ment contexts the set of all spaces is partitioned in as many subsets as there
are possible measurement results. In this case the multiplicity of the whole
universe does not change, nor does the complete spacetime arena.
5 Many minds
Albert and Loewer [14] gave the first full-fledged formulation of the idea that
the split involves the mind rather than the world. In the many-minds view,
every observer has associated with it an infinite set of minds. Minds are
associated with brain states but are not subject to superposition.
Many-minds approaches usually involve a single spacetime, in which dif-
ferent experiences coexist. But according to Lockwood [15],
the fact of a physical system’s being in a superposition, with
respect to some set of [consciousness] basis vectors, is to be un-
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derstood as the system’s having a dimension in addition to those
of time and space.
Just as one’s mind is usually thought as being wholly present at different
times when it has different experiences, it can also be thought, according to
Lockwood, as wholly present in each different experiences it can have at a
single time. These experiences can be viewed as lying on an axis orthogonal
to the time axis. Spacetime is therefore enlarged, but by a dimensionality
that is neither spatial nor temporal. Lockwood does not speculate on how
the spacetime metric can connect to the additional dimension.
6 Patterns in the wave function
Decoherence theory is an important building block of an approach to Everett
different from many worlds and many minds. It is mainly connected with
the names of Gell-Mann and Hartle [16], Saunders [17] and Wallace [18, 19]
(although Gell-Mann and Hartle favor one world in the end).
Wallace [18] identifies real structures with stable patterns in the universal
quantum state:
My claim is instead that the emergence of a classical world from
quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the emergence
from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and
that this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the
precision which Kent and others here demand.
At the beginning of an experiment, there is one apparatus pattern in the
universal quantum state. This, according to Wallace, means that there is
one apparatus. At the end of the experiment, the universal quantum state,
represented on the right-hand side of (1), contains two distinct apparatus
patterns. Therefore there are now two apparatus. It doesn’t make sense,
according to Wallace, to ask questions about the apparatus in the very short
decoherence timescale leading from one pattern to two patterns. Nor does
the existence of two distinct patterns cause problems for, as one can see in
Schro¨dinger’s cat imagery:
If A and B are to be ‘live cat’ and ‘dead cat’ then [the relevant
microscopic properties] P and Q will be described by statements
about the state vector which (expressed in a position basis) will
6
concern the wave-function’s amplitude in vastly separated regions
RP and RQ of configuration space, and there will be no contra-
diction between these statements.
So the live cat and the dead cat occupy different regions in configuration
space. But how do they project in three-dimensional space? In classical
theory, two different cats not only occupy different regions in configuration
space, but also different regions in three-space. That is, their projections
from configuration space to three-space do not overlap.
This, however, is not so with Wallace’s patterns. Projected in three-space,
the two cats may literally overlap. How can one understand this?
One possible answer is to assume that the live cat and the dead cat
don’t project from configuration space to the same three-space [20]. This
means, for instance, that there is an added parameter, or another dimension,
introduced to distinguish different three-spaces from each other.
This, however, is not the answer that Wallace prefers. According to
him, there is only one three-space into which both patterns project. This
implies that the live cat and the dead cat are, so to speak, ghostlike to each
other. In the words of Allori et al. [21], “[t]he two cats are [. . . ] reciprocally
transparent.”
Do we have to choose between one three-space and many three-spaces?
Investigating macroscopic ontology in Everettian quantum mechanics, Wil-
son [22] suggests that we may not:
[T]he ‘spacetime’ of the quantum mechanics and quantum field
theory formalism, in terms of which branches are defined, is not
the same as the ‘spacetimes’ of macroscopic worlds. The former
‘spacetime’ is a single entity common to multiple branches, while
each of the latter ‘spacetimes’ is tied to a particular macroscopic
course of events.
But Wilson also draws an analogy between bifurcation and consistent histo-
ries, each history being located in a distinct spacetime.
7 Discussion
We have shown elsewhere [10] that there is a wide spectrum of opinions,
among adherents to Everett’s approach, on the nature of Everettian multi-
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plicity. This, as we have just seen, translates into different views of space or
spacetime, which fall into two broad categories:
1. Space (or spacetime) genuinely splits upon measurement of a quantum
observable.
2. Space (and spacetime) don’t split.
To some extent, this alternative occurs in all three main approaches to mul-
tiplicity, namely, many worlds, many minds and decoherent sectors of the
wave function.
If space genuinely splits, the problems traditionally connected with state
vector collapse seem to be carried along the way. This does not mean that
Everett’s approach has to be rejected, but it invites Everettians to make their
views substantially sharper.
If space doesn’t split, we are confronted with various copies of macro-
scopic systems occupying the same spatial arena. The problem is, How can
these systems not interact? In other words, How is the macroscopic multi-
plicity reconciled with the quantum field theory of interacting constituents?
Wilson acknowledges the problem when he introduces two different notions
of spacetime. The solution, however, remains to be implemented.
8 Conclusion
Interpreting quantum mechanics consists in answering the question, How
can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? Everett’s approach is
one possible answer to the question. Every answer currently considered has
problems of its own. We conclude by pointing out three problems that are
perhaps more specific to Everett’s theory.
The first one is that it is not sharply defined. This has been documented
here with respect to spacetime, and in [10] with respect to multiplicity. This
contrasts with the de Broglie–Bohm approach which, at least in the nonrel-
ativistic case, is rather well defined. Other interpretations do carry some
measure of indefiniteness, for instance the Copenhagen distinction between
the quantum and the classical. But the diversity of views among Everett’s
adherents is particularly striking.
The second one can be considered either a problem or a strength, depend-
ing on one’s point of view. It consists in the fact that Everett’s approach
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is highly dependent on the exact validity of quantum mechanics. Everett’s
many worlds, so it seems, won’t survive the smallest nonlinear term to the
Schro¨dinger equation. By contrast, again, the de Broglie–Bohm approach is
highly adaptable to changes in the formalism of quantum mechanics [23].
The third problem has to do with Everett’s extraordinary ontology. True,
science has taught us that common sense is not always the best of guides. Yet,
as in experimental investigations, “Extraordinary claims require extraordi-
nary evidence.” Many critics of Everett’s approach believe that such evidence
has not convincingly been put forward by Everett’s supporters.
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